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Chapter 1
Introduction: Changing Frameworks for
Retirement Security
Olivia S. Mitchell
The passage of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of
1974 in the United States was spurred by the 1963 termination of the
Studebaker Corporation’s automaker’s pension plan. That development
wiped out or signiﬁcantly reduced the pensions of thousands of Studebaker
employees and retirees. In response, Congress undertook the crafting of this
monumental and revolutionary legislation to address corporate pension
underfunding and set new rules regarding deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) and
other retirement plans. Additionally, ERISA established the Pension Beneﬁt
Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) as government-run insurer, to serve as a
backdrop to US corporate pensions.
Despite the bill’s far-ranging scope, in the years since its passage it has
become evident that ERISA failed to achieve many of its intended objectives.
The corporate pension scene today is in turmoil, and most private employ-
ers have terminated or frozen their traditional deﬁned beneﬁt plans. In
their place, employers are increasingly substituting deﬁned contribution
(DC) retirement saving plans, which pose a new set of responsibilities on
employees and their ﬁrms. In this volume we investigate how and why
traditional approaches to pension risk management have failed, and we
also explore new mechanisms that can help strengthen retirement security
for the future.
Assessing the Retirement System: Adequacy,
Efﬁciency, and Stability
There has been much energetic debate over the question of how well
Americans prepare for retirement. In the ﬁrst section of this volume, several
authors offer their perspectives on the strengths and weaknesses of the
current retirement system. One approach, by Alicia Munnell, Matthew
Rutledge, and Anthony Webb, uses the National Retirement Risk Index
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(NRRI). The authors apply this measure to a variety of datasets and con-
clude that more than half of working-age households in the US are at risk of
failing to maintain their pre-retirement standard of living in retirement. Yet
other analysts have arrived at less dire conclusions, and some even propose
that the majority of older workers have accumulated an optimal level of
retirement wealth. In order to evaluate what, if any, policies might be useful
in strengthening retirement security, it is helpful to establish the sources of
this dissonance.
Munnell and co-authors seek to reconcile the conﬂicting evidence by
updating their NRRI projections and simulating how their results differ
under different assumptions regarding preferences and drawdown strat-
egies. For instance, they show that their ﬁndings are sensitive to assumed
changes in household consumption before and after children leave home.
On the one hand, adjusting their NRRI metric to allow for the presence and
then the departure of children in the household yields results similar to
those from the more sanguine analysts. On the other hand, there is some
evidence that households do cut back spending as they age; further, house-
holds with insufﬁcient resources also cut back their post-retirement con-
sumption to a greater degree than households having sufﬁcient retirement
resources, by their computations.
Jack VanDerhei approaches the question of whether Baby Boomers and
Gen Xers will have enough money saved for retirement from a different
perspective. Here the author asks whether Americans will have enough
assets to replicate 100 percent of their pre-retirement expenses, along with
two lower thresholds. His Retirement Readiness Ratings show that 57–9
percent of older households will not fall short of money in retirement
using the 100 percent criterion, taking into account both long-term care
and home health costs. Additionally, people eligible to contribute to a DC
pension are likely to be better off, compared to those ineligible.
In her work on a closely related topic, Julia Coronado examines the
employment situation of the Baby Boom generation in the wake of the
Great Recession of 2008–10. She notes that more than half of all workers
retiring since the Great Recession reported that they retired earlier than
planned, citing economic rather than health considerations. The younger
end of that generation, and men in particular, were most likely to report
disruptions in their work lives. Interestingly, while the Social Security ‘full’
retirement age is rising, peoples’ actual behavior is going in the direction of
earlier retirement. Coronado concludes that much of this is unintended
retirement, and she suggests that this implies that future retirees will not be
as well off as previous retirees.
To round out the assessment of America’s retirement system, Gene
Steuerle, Pamela Perun, and Benjamin Harris point out that the so-called
‘entitlement’ programs, Social Security and Medicare, face deep ﬁnancial
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/12/2015, SPi
2 Reimagining Pensions
problems. The authors recommend that entitlement reforms take advan-
tage of the additional resources provided by economic growth, along with
growth in both the demand for and supply of older workers. To this end,
they outline reforms aimed at three goals: better orientation of public sector
retirement resources to needier and older populations; removal of obstacles
to increased employment of older workers; and private-pension reform that
provides the long-sought second tier of support in older ages. In particular,
economic growth has provided households with signiﬁcant increases in GDP
per household, of $141,000 in 2014, projected to rise to $168,000 in 2024.
Moreover, demand for older workers is likely to rise as population trends
result in fewer younger workers, but they add that, right now, wealthier
individuals actually account for the majority of the working elderly.
Since Social Security beneﬁts are progressive, they tend to be more valuable
to the older, poorer population. As a result, the authors argue that changes
in the beneﬁt formulas will be necessary to keep from discouraging older
people from working.
New Approaches to Retirement Risk Sharing
The middle section of this volume takes up alternative pension models, and
these chapters do much to enlighten the discussion of reform proposals. In
their chapter, Anna M. Rappaport and Andrew Peterson discuss the fact that
pension plan designs have very different risk allocations depending on their
design. Some models place virtually all risks on the plan sponsor, while
others place the risk on covered workers and retirees. The writers suggest
that policy changes will be needed to underpin new plan designs that do a
better job of risk sharing. The most salient concerns are investment risk,
interest rate risk, inﬂation risk, and longevity risk. Potential new models
could involve moving to DC plans, paying retirees lump sums, indexing
retirement ages, adjusting beneﬁts for longer life spans, selecting assump-
tions for DB plan valuation that build in more mortality improvement, and
using ﬁnancial instruments to manage this risk. Even in DC plans, there can
still be plan sponsor risk: for instance, there is ﬁduciary risk as well as
workforce management risk that may arise if employees are unable to afford
to retire.
An interesting case study of a private sector union is reviewed by David
S. Blitzstein who demonstrates how labor unions can renegotiate the pen-
sion contract. In his chapter, he describes how one union responded
proactively by developing a hybrid pension plan that sought to align stake-
holders through equitable risk sharing. The newmodel was called a Variable
Deﬁned Beneﬁt Plan (later referred to as the Adjustable Pension Plan or
APP). It was structured like a DB plan, in that retirement and longevity risks
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were pooled, and all assets were pooled and managed professionally. But in
contrast to a DB plan, the new model shares investment performance
between the employer and plan participants. Speciﬁcally, the Variable
Plan beneﬁt is the greater of two beneﬁts calculated each year: either a
‘ﬂoor’ deﬁned beneﬁt (a ﬂat beneﬁt accrual or salary-based career average
formula), and a ‘variable’ beneﬁt that ﬂuctuates depending on actual
investment performance. Moreover, the annual beneﬁt accrual can never
be lower than the ﬂoor beneﬁt. Numerous other unions have expressed
interest in this model as well.
Donald Fuerst also favors a variable annuity plan that will provide partici-
pants with lifetime income without exposing them to the risk of running out
of money at advanced ages. In exchange for this income guarantee, partici-
pants accept the risk and rewards that actual investment returns provide.
Moreover, a variable annuity plan offers the employer cost stability and
predictability, similar to a DC plan, but the sponsor accepts longevity risk.
His model, termed the Retirement Shares Plan, enhances the typical vari-
able annuity plan by allowing participants to elect more stable beneﬁts. That
is, beneﬁts are adjusted every year to reﬂect invest gains and losses, and the
plan is relatively indifferent to discount rates. There is still debate about how
aggressively to invest, between younger and older participants, which he
argues can be dealt with using a limited set of portfolio alternatives.
A different approach to hybrid retirement plans would combine the best
features of DB and DC plans according to the chapter by Benjamin Good-
man and David P. Richardson. In their view, the TIAA-CREF system which
began in 1918 and now covers millions of workers in the nonproﬁt sector,
provides a useful example of how to incorporate features of hybrid co-
operative design into a retirement plan. The Teachers Insurance and Annu-
ity Association (TIAA) offers a contributory guaranteed ﬁxed annuity plan,
where participants have the right but not the obligation to annuitize assets,
while the College Retirement Equity Fund (CREF) was the ﬁrst commer-
cially available variable annuity sold in the US. The plan is a co-operative
structure, ‘owned’ by participants, and it features population and cohort risk
pooling, while assets are fully portable within the system.
Echoing the theme that intelligent risk sharing between employers
and individuals can greatly improve retirement outcomes Richard C. Shea,
Robert S. Newman, and Jonathan P. Goldberg describe the Portfolio Pen-
sion Plan (PPP) model. This approach adapts a DB plan design to rebalance
the allocation of risks to employers and individuals. In particular, it is
modeled on a cash balance design in which the employee’s account balance
is adjusted based on investment returns and his portfolio is adjusted over
time in line with his changing circumstances. Rather than credit a single rate
for all participants, each individual’s account balance in a PPP is adjusted
based on the return to his individually tailored retirement investment
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portfolio. Several of the design features central to this plan have been
incorporated into legislative proposals and regulations.
Turning to the regulatory environment in which new plans can be struc-
tured, John M. Vine believes that employers have migrated away from
traditional DB plans because DC and some hybrid plans have proven
more compatible with their own interests and those of their employees.
Moreover, ERISA and other regulations have been intended to safeguard
participants in existing plans, but they have failed to encourage the estab-
lishment of new plans covered under the regulation. Indeed, one result of
ERISA’s strictures is that states and the federal government are now propos-
ing so-called ‘Simple Choice’ plans, which would avoid ERISA’s regulatory
framework by virtue of being entirely employee-ﬁnanced.
Pension Reform: Lessons from Abroad
The ﬁnal section of this volume offers a number of insights into new pension
models being developed outside the US. The Netherlands has been a
particularly fertile source of new ideas, including the ‘Deﬁned Ambition’
(DA) plans proposed by Lans Bovenberg, Roel Mehlkopf, and Theo
Nijman. Despite the fact that plan participants had believed that the old-
style Dutch DB plans were safe, in fact ‘guaranteed’ promises could not be
kept post-ﬁnancial crisis. The authors favor DA plans as they allow ﬁrms to
continue providing a distributional platform for pension saving, while redu-
cing plan sponsor risk-bearing compared to the traditional DB environ-
ment. This, the authors contend, addresses behavioral and agency issues
as well as imperfections of insurance and ﬁnancial markets.
In a DA plan, pension entitlements would be stipulated as deferred
annuities, and participants must share the capital market risk via a joint
liability pool. The chapter focuses on workplace-based pension schemes that
can provide lifetime income streams during retirement. All Dutch workers
would be automatically enrolled in these plans, thereby reducing marketing
and other transaction costs, and protecting individuals against myopia and
other behavioral biases. The conversion of existing DB rights into DA rights
will be complicated by the fact that, under traditional DB plans, individual
property rights were not objectively valued. That is, these contracts were
incomplete so it was unclear who bore which risks. Moreover, these risks
were not well communicated to plan participants. The authors suggest that
DC plans in the US could better manage risk for participants if investments
could be more ‘liability-driven’. In other words, retirement income needs
would be identiﬁed as in the DA setting, and the target income streams
would be used to construct investment portfolios.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/12/2015, SPi
Introduction 5
In a discussion of Switzerland’s pension system, Monika Bütler describes
that country’s three-pillar system and considers some of the challenges the
system faces in the context of a rapidly aging society. A ﬁrst pillar is a pay-
as-you-go system that seeks to provide a subsistence level of income to all
retired residents. A second pillar is an employer-based, fully funded occu-
pational pension scheme, mandatory for all employees whose annual
income exceeds a certain threshold. Means-tested supplemental beneﬁts
may be claimed if total income does not cover basic needs in old age.
A voluntary third pillar, which is an individual tax-deductible savings
account for retirement, completes the model. The ﬁrst two pillars yield a
gross replacement rate of about 60 percent, and a net replacement rate of
70–80 percent. Switzerland does have a high elderly labor force participa-
tion rate, but early retirement is permitted at ages 62 and 63, respectively,
with a beneﬁt reduction of 6.8 percent per year early. Future challenges for
the Swiss retirement model include funding and long-term care ﬁnancing,
just as in the US.
In an interesting comparison of the Australian and US economies and
demographics, Rafal Chomik and John Piggott evaluate how Australia’s
retirement income structure performs in terms of economic efﬁciency and
efﬁcacy in delivering old-age support. Australia’s retirement income system
is comprised by a ﬂat-rate, non-contributory, afﬂuence-tested age pension;
this ﬁrst pillar operates as a non-contributory transfer potentially available to
all residents. A second pillar is a national mandatory deﬁned contribution
plan to which ﬁrms must contribute 9.25 percent (moving to 12 percent) of
wages on behalf of their employees. Access to the second-pillar funds is
available tax-free at age 60. There is also a third pillar made up of voluntary
retirement saving. This structure has resulted in low poverty rates for people
age 65+, and private pension coverage is also higher in Australia than in
other developed nations. In addition, marginal tax rates are also higher. The
authors suggest that more means-testing might be a path that the United
States could pursue.
Singapore, like Australia, also has a national mandatory deﬁned contri-
bution retirement saving system. In his chapter, Benedict Koh describes how
the Central Provident Fund (CPF) has functioned over the past half-century,
along with its success in achieving nearly universal home ownership, health
care coverage, and ﬁnancial protection. Nevertheless, many people have
inadequate retirement assets due to high transaction costs, lack of ﬁnancial
literacy, and inertia. Additionally, CPF participants may withdraw money to
purchase homes, service mortgage payments, and ﬁnance premiums for
insurance protection or children’s tertiary education. People may also invest
in a permitted list of ﬁnancial products, but few have taken advantage of the
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large menu of investment instruments on offer to grow their retirement
savings, instead leaving the monies in their CPF accounts where they earned
a safe but low interest rate. Since 2013, it has also been mandatory for all
CPF members to invest their RA savings in deferred life annuities that
provide them with an income stream until their deaths.
Focusing on retirement saving adequacy, Koh explains that the CPF
Board established the Minimum Sum Scheme with the goal of requiring
members to retain a minimum level of savings for old age. From July 2013
onwards, members must set aside S$148,000 in their Retirement Account
upon reaching age 55, which is believed sufﬁcient to support a subsistence
level of living. Nevertheless, many members lack sufﬁcient cash savings, and
currently fewer than half of those turning age 55 meet the Minimum Sum
Scheme requirement. Some possible reforms could involve raising older
persons’ contribution rates, ways to help monetize peoples’ homes, increas-
ing investment returns, and extending retirement ages. Koh also discusses
the positive effect of introducing new low-cost default portfolios such
as target-date funds. In this sense, the Singaporean system has adopted
elements of the US deﬁned contribution model.
Conclusion
Forty years ago, many observers hailed ERISA and its amendments as
absolutely instrumental for strengthening private sector employer pensions
in America. And by some criteria, there is much to be proud of. In 1974, for
instance, when ERISA was passed, the total assets of private pension plans
amounted to $164 billion (Sirkin 1994). Now US private pension assets have
grown to almost $25 trillion (ICI 2015), despite having passed through one
of the toughest market downturns in history. Unfortunately, with hindsight,
Steve Sass was prescient when he argued that ‘ERISA neither solidiﬁed nor
undermined the nation’s private pension institution; it merely marked its
high-water level’ (1997: 229). Traditional DB pensions were the creation of
big labor, big business, and big government. Today, employees and plan
sponsors have a very different perspective on risk management, the work-
place, and capital markets, compared to 40 years ago.
In the twenty-ﬁrst century, we have a much clearer view of the common
risks facing the world’s retirement systems; these include rising but uncer-
tain longevity, probably lower investment yields, and rising health care costs.
This volume will generate discussion for years to come, on how to craft a
pension system for workers, retirees, and plan sponsors of the future.
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